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Key points
1. Vladimir Putin’s first term as President was 
a period of submitting political, regional and eco-
nomic lobbies to the Kremlin. The actions Putin
has taken since being re-elected are aimed at con-
solidating the Kremlin’s control over the political,
economic and social spheres. Further liquidation
of political and informational pluralism, an in-
crease of the ruling group’s control over state and
private property, and an intensification of state
propaganda aimed at generating social support
for the Kremlin’s initiatives have all proceeded
apace. These processes reinforce authoritarian
tendencies and strengthen the emerging mono-
centric political system, with the President’s
strong domination over political, economic and
social life.
2. Since Putin’s re-election no return to wide-rang-
ing economic reforms can be observed; previously,
the reformist impetus of the President’s team
had been checked halfway though his first term
of office, with a view to the approaching parlia-
mentary and presidential elections). Thus, the
concentration of power in the President’s hands
(which had been repeatedly named as a sine qua
non for the implementation of unpopular re-
forms) has not brought about any continuation
of economic reforms. The authorities have limited
themselves to selected actions in the social sphe-
re and have made no attempts to reform the area
of the natural resource monopolies. Nor have they
guaranteed to put into practice the pro-market
acts which had been passed during Putin’s first
term of office. Instead, one may observe the con-
sumption of the fruits of the boom in the raw
material markets, and the demonstration of Rus-
sia’s remarkable economic indicators (which in
fact mostly derive from high oil prices). Mean-
while, unfavourable conditions for long-term eco-
nomic development in Russia are growing: the ar-
chaic structure of the economy is being streng-
thened (the overwhelming dominance of big bu-
sinesses over small- and medium-sized enter-
prises in GDP production); the raw-material pro-
file of the Russian economy is being reinforced (at
the cost of services and technologies), the Krem-
lin’s political control and “manual steering” of
the economy is growing, and corruption (the
which is a serious problem for the effective func-
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tioning of the Russian economy) has not been
reduced.
3. The elections and the beginning of Vladimir
Putin’s second term of office were a period which
saw an increase in the Kremlin’s control over both
state and private property. This was done by
strengthening the position of big state compa-
nies (especially in the raw materials sector), by
increasing the amount of state regulation over
the strategic sectors of the economy, and by
tightening control of private companies. At the
same time, the right to private property is being
violated by the ruling elite. Under the pretext of
collecting delinquent tax demands, the authori-
ties are attempting to take over the assets of
Russia’s biggest private company, the oil con-
cern Yukos. Such actions have already lead to an
increased flight of capital from Russia, and to a
general deterioration of the country’s image as
a stable, predictable economic partner which
encourages foreign investments.
4. In the last few months Russian political life has
witnessed a visible intensification of Kremlin pro-
paganda, based on the ideology of security. The
authorities are trying to create an image of Russia
as a country besieged by the hostile outside
world (especially the West), and undermined from
within by a democratic “fifth column”. The Rus-
sian authorities, using the media, are requiring 
a unification of forces in the battle against terro-
rism. In practice, this means a strengthening of
the President’s powers at the cost of other cen-
tres of public life, as well as an intensification of
xenophobia and distrust towards all forms of
dissidence and dissent. Moreover, the Kremlin is
trying to involve the Russian Orthodox Church
in the struggle for people’s minds. The authori-
ties have appealed to Orthodox hierarchs for “ac-
tive participation in fighting terrorism by boost-
ing society’s morale”.
5. Since the very beginning of Vladimir Putin’s
rule, we have witnessed a visible expansion in
the appointment of security service representa-
tives (the so-called “chekists”), as well as their in-
creasing influence on politics, the economy and
social issues. This tendency has been maintained
since Putin’s re-election. At the moment, the “che-
kists” have influence not only on state govern-
ment issues, but also have increasing access to
financial resources. At the present stage of Putin’s
rule, a wider process can be noted of appointing
Putin’s close colleagues from the security servi-
ces to key posts in state-controlled companies.
Also, the “chekists” activity keeps growing in the
sphere of ideology.
Introduction
The aim of this text is to try and sketch President
Putin’s policy course in his second term of office.
This is done on the basis of analyses of the most
crucial actions that the President took or initiated
after his re-election. We consider the date of the
presidential elections (14 March 2004) as the be-
ginning of Putin’s second term of office. How-
ever, the beginning of his second term may also
be dated from 7 May 2004 (when he was inau-
gurated), 5 March 2004 (when he appointed the
new government of Mikhail Fradkov), or 7 Decem-
ber 2003 (the date of the pro-presidential par-
ties’ sweeping victory in the parliamentary elec-
tions).
The text begins with a short presentation of the
course and results of the parliamentary and
presidential elections. This is the starting point
for a sketch of the political and economic con-
text in which Putin found himself at the begin-
ning of his second term. Furthermore, we ana-
lyse the President’s actions in areas such as poli-
tics, the economy, security and social questions.
On this basis, we try to sketch out the course of
Putin’s policy during his second term of office, as
well as to answer the question of how Putin’s
rule may appear up to the year 2008, and what
consequences it may have on Russia’s further
development.
I. Political and economic 
context
The elections to the State Duma, the lower cham-
ber of the Russian parliament, took place on 7 De-
cember 2003 (the members of the higher cham-
ber, the Federation Council, are appointed, not
elected). The elections were a sweeping success
for the pro-Kremlin party United Russia (Yedi-
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naya Rossiya). United Russia now comprises mo-
re than two-thirds of all the Duma’s deputies1.
Such an overwhelming majority allows them to
promote their political projects efficiently, as well
as to pass or revise laws (including the Constitu-
tion)2.
The pro-Kremlin parties have been so successful
due to the Kremlin’s backing and the support of
Vladimir Putin himself, as well as the assistance
of the popular media and the regional elites (who
– under pressure from Moscow – made every
effort to ensure a result favourable to the pro-pre-
sidential parties). This situation demonstrates
how powerful the authorities’ influence over the
election process is. Thus, last year’s parliamentary
elections are often thought of as the moment
when the result of the approaching presidential
elections was determined (in Putin’s favour). In a
wider sense, they are often considered to be the
moment of the final consolidation of the mono-
centric political system in Russia3.
On 5 March (a week and a half before the presi-
dential elections) a new Russian government
was formed, with Mikhail Fradkov as the Prime
Minister. The hasty dismissal of the former go-
vernment (led by Mikhail Kasyanov) and the for-
mation of the new cabinet took place before the
elections, and not straight after them, as is usual.
This was probably caused by political circum-
stances (namely, the fear Putin and his inner cir-
cle had of Kasyanov’s assuming power in case
the presidential elections were rendered null and
void4). The shape of Fradkov’s cabinet proclaims
unambiguously that the government plays a me-
rely “technical” role in the Russian political sys-
tem. The cabinet’s autonomy is significantly limi-
ted, and the ministers appointed are absolutely
loyal to the President. Many influential politicians
from the Yeltsin team have left the government.
The Prime Minister is a technocrat devoid of po-
litical ambitions, and is dependent on President
Putin. Thus, the new government has become 
a loyal executor of the Kremlin’s projects5.
On 14 March Vladimir Putin won in the first
round of the presidential elections, gaining 71.3
per cent of the vote. The elections in fact took on
the character of a plebiscite, with voters express-
ing their support for the acting President and his
policy. Putin’s sweeping victory resulted from
his unwavering popularity during his whole first
term of office, as well as from the Kremlin’s con-
trol over the election process, which ensured
Putin a definite advantage over the rival candi-
dates6.
During Putin’s rule, the Russian economy has
prospered, thanks to the worldwide boom on the
raw material markets. The Russian economy has
been growing for several years now; in 2000 its
GDP grew by 10 per cent, by 5.1 per cent in 2001,
4.7 per cent in 2002, and 7.3 per cent in 2003 (the
prediction for 2004 is 6.6 per cent7). However, the
sources of this growth have changed. In 2003,
Russia’s economic growth was based on both high
oil prices and rapidly growing domestic demand
(both in investment and consumption)8. At this
moment, the basic source of Russia’s economic
growth are principally oil prices9 (exceeding
US$40 a Urals barrel at the time of writing10).
Some economists even argue that without this
income from raw material export, Russia’s eco-
nomic growth would have been negative11.
The expectations connected with Putin’s actions
in his second term of office boil down to two
fundamental questions: on one hand, whether
Putin’s strong position will bring about a con-
tinuation of the economic reforms started back
in 2000, and on the other, how is the succession
question going to be resolved. The author of this
text has attempted to answer these questions,
and to formulate key points and predictions
regarding the nature of the political and econo-
mic system in Russia, as well as its perspectives
for the future.
II. President Putin’s policy
since re-election
Since Vladimir Putin’s victory in the presidential
elections, the authorities have undertaken a num-
ber of actions with the aim of a further concen-
tration of power in the hands of the Kremlin.
These actions have affected the political, eco-
nomic and social spheres. As a result, the emerg-
ing monocentric political system has been con-
solidated, with its clear (and still growing) domi-
nation of the Kremlin over all key areas of Rus-
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sian political life. This is inextricably linked with
the intensification of authoritarian tendencies in
Russia, such as the Kremlin’s “manual steering”
the domestic policy, the reduction of political and
informational pluralism, and the minimisation of
social control over the authorities’ policies.
This increased concentration of political power
is being carried out with the succession of 2008
in mind (when Vladimir Putin’s second and last
term of office expires), or – which cannot be ruled
out – with Putin’s extension of rule in mind12.
The ruling team is attempting to maintain its ex-
clusive position in the process of appointing
Putin’s successor, or in amending the Constitution
so that the current President can stay in office.
The events following Putin’s victory in the pres-
idential elections also prove that a number of
the important processes initiated during Putin’s
first term are continuing. In particular, we note
the ever-growing influence of representatives of
the security service on state policy; the intensifi-
cation of propaganda activity aimed at inculcat-
ing social support for the Kremlin’s successive po-
licy initiatives, and in the economic field a slow-
down in the liberal reforms, replaced by a policy
of consumption permitted by the favourable si-
tuation on the world raw material markets13.
1. The concentration of power and
the reinforcement of authoritarian
tendencies
Following Putin’s re-election, the authorities in-
tensified the actions aimed at concentrating po-
wer in the hands of the Kremlin and the further
neutralisation of different political and econom-
ic lobbies. These actions have primarily been
aimed at the regional elites, big business circles,
the media and the NGO sector, as well as the legis-
lative and judicial branches of power.
One of the most important actions which has
been taken is the President’s initiative to change
the principles for electing regional governors,
which may affect the whole political system14.
The governors, who hitherto have been elected
in general elections, are now to be nominated by
the President (the choice is to be approved by re-
gional parliaments). The implementation of the
President’s initiative would change Russia’s po-
litical system and actually turn the Russian Fede-
ration into a centrally-governed unitary state.
This decision also seems questionable from the
viewpoint of how efficient this type of adminis-
tration may be in such a vast country. There are
fears that the “presidential governor” may have
little social legitimacy and a limited independence
in the decision-making process. In some extreme
situations, this could lead to a paralysis of deci-
sion in the regions, and would often burden Mos-
cow with the necessity of interfering and mana-
ging the situation in the regions directly15. This
initiative is quite controversial to a number of
Russian constitutionalists, as well as to Russian
society in general (as surveys show, two-thirds
of respondents are in favour of keeping the sys-
tem of directly electing the governors16).
Together with the aforementioned reform, Pre-
sident Putin has announced his suggestions con-
cerning electoral regulations (parliamentary ele-
ctions), which have been considered behind the
scenes for some time. The current “mixed” elec-
toral system is to be replaced by a “proportional”
one. Such a scheme would eliminate the single-
mandate electoral districts (where half of the de-
puties are elected), and would lead to members
of parliament being elected only from the party
lists. This would in turn dramatically reduce the
possibility that any politician independent of
the Kremlin, representing the regions, business
or democratic circles might obtain a mandate.
Any candidate would have to participate in the
elections in consultation with political parties,
and on those parties’ conditions – and almost all
of the parties in the Duma are connected with
the Kremlin.
The new electoral regulations are to be complet-
ed by a directive concerning raising the electoral
threshold from 5 to 7 per cent17. The change to
the electoral system and the raising of the elec-
tion threshold may lead to permanent marginali-
sation of those parties not connected with the
Kremlin (such as the Russian democratic parties,
whose popular support does not exceed 5 per
cent). This would eventually lead to the emer-
gence of a party scene dominated by two or three
major political parties, more or less dependent
on the authorities.
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Another initiative (which is in the process of pass-
ing through the Duma) is the proposal to quin-
tuple the required number of party members
(from 10,000 to 50,000)18. There are also other ini-
tiatives aimed at subordinating members of par-
liament by imposing strict sanctions for less im-
portant misdemeanours. All this demonstrates
that the Kremlin is aiming to strengthen its con-
trol over the legislative power, even though it
already has efficient instruments of control at
its disposal.
The Kremlin has also taken analogous actions
towards the judicial branch of government. On
29 September 2004, the Federation Council (the
upper chamber of the Russian parliament) pre-
sented a set of draft acts whose aim is to
strengthen the President’s control over the key
bodies of the judiciary. The main proposal con-
cerns granting the President the right to appoint
more than half the members of the qualification
council (which decides on the suspension of jud-
ges’ immunity, among other matters). The remain-
ing members are to be appointed by the Federa-
tion Council itself (currently the council members
are elected by the judicial congress). Another cru-
cial initiative concerns giving the President the
right to appoint the head of the general court
department of the Supreme Court (this depart-
ment is responsible for the staffing, financing
and technical security of Russian courts).
The implementation of the abovementioned ini-
tiatives would mean a statutory consolidation of
the Kremlin’s control over the judicial branch (al-
though the Kremlin has anyway been exerting in-
formal pressure on courts). The President could
officially decide to deprive “disloyal” judges of
their immunity, or use the judges’ financial and
material dependence to push through certain
court verdicts.
The authorities have also introduced a statutory
possibility of preventing any public demonstra-
tion of social disapproval of Kremlin or govern-
mental policy. On 30 June 2004 a new act con-
cerning referenda came into force, which sub-
stantially reduces the possibilities of organising
a national referendum, and subjects this pro-
cess to a strict control of the authorities (initia-
tive groups are supposed to be registered on ma-
ny levels, and should complete the whole proce-
dure within a strictly specified period of time)19.
Two years ago the Duma banned any organisa-
tion of a referendum in an election year, fearing
that the communist opposition might have or-
ganised a referendum concerning the unpopular
economic reforms which were being implemented
at the time.
A further example of the reduction of the right
to express disapproval of the authorities’ policy is
the act entitled “On gatherings, rallies, demon-
strations and manifestations” (passed on 9 June
2004). This act sets strict demands of the organi-
sers of such undertakings; among other things,
it complicates the procedure of organising such
actions, and forbids them from being organised
in the vicinity of the President’s residence. This
enables the authorities to enhance the mecha-
nism for controlling public actions, and to pre-
vent wider opposition actions directed against
the government or the Kremlin.
The authorities’ initiatives have also reached the
political party scene. During the period of the
parliamentary and presidential elections, the
Kremlin made attempts to neutralise the only
influential political opposition – the Communist
Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF). At the
time the Communists enjoyed substantial sup-
port, and strongly opposed the government’s so-
cially unpopular decisions. The authorities have
therefore inspired or supported several splits in
the Communist ranks. In 2002, one of the CPRF
leaders, Gennady Seleznyov, left the party to
establish his own Russia Revival Party, and in
2003 another influential communist politician,
Sergey Glazyev, set up the Homeland (Rodina)
party and succeeded in seizing a good deal of
communist votes in the parliamentary elections.
In 2004, the Communists faced one more schism:
Gennady Semigin created an “alternative” Com-
munist Party luring away a numerous group of
activists from the CPRF. The authorities have also
tried to create loyal and manipulable parties on
the right wing: every once in a while the press
mentions marginal parties like the New Right,
who declare that they “join liberal values with
patriotic ones”, and support the Kremlin’s policy.
71
P
u
ti
n
 a
ft
e
r 
re
-e
le
c
ti
o
n
C E S  S t u d i e s
We may presently observe a further reduction in
the freedom of speech. During Vladimir Putin’s
first term of office, the authorities established
control over major Russian media (first of all po-
pular television stations Pervyi Kanal [The First
Channel, formerly ORT] and RTR), and generated
a self-censorship effect among journalists. After
Putin’s re-election, the authorities started liqui-
dating the “autonomous zones” which still exist-
ed in some of the media. First of all this policy
affected the popular NTV station, which although
controlled by the state-owned firm Gazprom en-
joyed a fair amount of independence as far as its
news programmes and political commentaries
were concerned. NTV has undergone a number
of personnel changes (for example, Putin’s uni-
versity colleague Tamara Gavrilova was appoint-
ed deputy director of the station). Popular politi-
cal programmes which dared to criticise the au-
thorities (Namedni [Nowadays], Svoboda slova
[Freedom of speech]) have been cancelled, and
the channel has started to be used for broad-
casting propaganda programmes20.
The authorities are also trying to tighten their
control over the procedure for issuing licences
for the media. A Committee dealing with media
licences is being formed within the government,
and it is to be headed by Boris Boyarskov, a re-
presentative of the “Petersburg chekist” circle.
From time to time, initiatives also appear which
are aimed at tightening control over Russian In-
ternet sites21, although this demand seems quite
impossible to realise nowadays.
2. Reform of the state administration
and the efficiency thereof
During and immediately after the election period,
President Putin initiated reform of the state ad-
ministration – first of all, of the government and
the Presidential Administration. The changes im-
plemented have not however improved the effi-
ciency of the state administration; in many cases,
they have disorganised the Cabinet’s activity and
dramatically reduced its effectiveness.
On 8 March 2004, Vladimir Putin signed an exe-
cutive order which introduced a new structure
of government. The aim of this reform was to
create a clear structure and hierarchy within the
cabinet, and (in some cases) to change the com-
petencies and scope of responsibility of certain mi-
nistries. As of now, the government has a three-
-level structure: the ministries (which prepare the
guidelines of the state policy in the field they deal
with), federal services (which monitor the imple-
mentation of state policy) and the agencies (which
provide state services within their sphere of com-
petence). The federal services and the agencies
are subordinated to the ministries.
Another change is the reduction of the number
of ministries from 30 to 16 (some of them have
beenmerged, such as the Ministries for Health
Care and Social Development, the Ministries of
Science and Education, and the Ministries of Cul-
ture and Media). The number of deputy Prime
Ministers has been reduced from six to one, and
the number of deputy ministers has also been
significantly decreased.
The government reform was intended to increase
transparency regarding ministerial competencies
and responsibilities, and to reduce the over-infla-
ted government apparatus22. Meanwhile, the real
number of bureaucrats and office workers has
not decreased. Moreover, the first months of the
reform’s implementation were dominated by
chaos and paralysis in the decision-making pro-
cess. The cabinet, busy with organising and re-
distributing its own competencies, was unable
to fulfil a number of its immediate functions and
duties. As a result, the government’s efficiency
was considerably reduced.
Putin has also introduced cosmetic changes in
the Presidential Administration (PA)23. The num-
ber of deputy heads of Administration has been
reduced to two; Administration civil servants act
as the President’s assistants and advisers. The
changes implemented have not affected the Pre-
sidential Administration’s performance – in the
current political system, it remains the key cen-
tre of decision in Russia. In the structure of the
whole Russian administration, the PA is the au-
thority which makes key decisions, prepares stra-
tegies in the crucial spheres of politics and econ-
omy, and holds overall control of the political,
economic and social fields in Russia.
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3. Withdrawal from the economic
reforms
Comparing with the beginning of Vladimir
Putin’s first term of office, at the moment we
can observe a visible withdrawal from the eco-
nomic reforms24. The “modernisation project” (as
the set of liberal and pro-market reforms has been
called) has visibly lost its priority position at the
moment. The authorities carry out only selected
reformist actions in some spheres of economy.
Finalisation of many structural economic reforms
(first of all the monopolies, like the energy con-
cern RAO JES Rossii and the Russian Railways) is
being put off. The restructuring of the gas mo-
nopoly Gazprom has not been started at all.
The reforms initiated by the government and the
parliament in 2004 in fact came down to passing
a bill on the so-called monetarisation of the
social benefits25, though – it’s worth mentioning
– this bill has a great significance for the Russian
budget. The aim of the bill is to convert certain
social benefits (granted for war veterans, the
handicapped, single mothers, etc.) to cash pay-
ments, directed to concrete people. Such solu-
tion is meant to reduce the immense social bur-
den which overloads the federal budget. Instead,
the cash subsidies are supposed to be financed
by the regional budgets. However, the regions
may also have serious problems with lifting
such an immense financial burden. The threat of
the regional budgets’ insufficiency causes great
social resistance towards this reform.
At the moment, the government is working on
the tax laws – the reduction of the social tax and
VAT is planned for 2005. Next year will probably
be the time of final implementation of another
sphere of the budget reform – the demarcation
of powers between the centre and the regions
(this concerns financial matters, federal and re-
gional property, etc.). The banking reform, start-
ed in 2000, is progressing gradually. Its aim is to
adapt Russian banking sector to western stan-
dards. Recently, however, the reform came down
to causing a number of bankruptcies of minor
banks, which had not fulfilled the financial and
structural criteria, set by the reformers.
The authorities have not been determined enough
to continue or complete key structural reforms,
especially in the natural monopoly sector. Re-
structuring of Gazprom, announced earlier, has
been postponed. At the moment the government
is only considering the possibility of Gazprom’s
share market liberalisation26. The reform of the
energy-producing monopoly RAO JES Rossii has
been stopped at the crucial stage, when power
engineering companies in the neighbouring re-
gions were to be united into bigger regional com-
panies. The railway reform has not been finished,
either – the Russian Railways company, created
after state railway restructuring, heavily domi-
nates on the market and impedes competition in
the railway traffic sector. One can observe stag-
nation in another important sphere of Russian
economy, which was supposed to be reformed –
the housing sector. The reform’s aim was to li-
beralise the municipal services prices, and at the
same time to modernise the deteriorating hous-
ing infrastructure and provide subsidies for the
poorest ones. For the last 2 years, the municipal
service rates have been steadily growing all over
Russia. This, however, has not brought about im-
provement of the municipal service quality and
has not lead to modernising of the housing infra-
structure27.
4. Development of the state property
The beginning of Vladimir Putin’s second term
of office was a period of strengthening and ex-
panding the Kremlin’s control over state property.
This process started already during President Pu-
tin’s first term of office, when the authorities star-
ted to regain control over companies with state
shares (among other companies, the gas mo-
nopoly Gazprom, which in fact used to be an au-
tonomous structure28). At the moment strategic
companies fully or partly owned by the state (like
Gazprom, Rosneft, Transneft, the Russian Rail-
ways) are controlled by the Kremlin and have be-
come an element of financial base of the ruling
elite. They are also perceived as the Kremlin’s
instrument in the domestic and foreign policy29.
At the moment we are witnessing the process of
strengthening and developing of the companies
controlled by the state. This is being done by
carrying out mergers of state companies or by
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incorporating smaller state companies into the
bigger ones. The best example of such policy is 
a resent incorporation of the state oil concern
Rosneft into Gazprom (the next to be incorpora-
ted is the Zarubezhneft concern). There is a proba-
bility that Gazprom will also engross the assets
of the oil concern Yukos, which is at the thresh-
old of bankruptcy. As a result, there may emerge
a huge state corporation dealing with gas and
oil and heavily dominating on the Russian raw
materials market.
As a result of such Kremlin’s policy, we witness the
emerging of powerful corporations controlled by
the state (and in fact by the ruling Kremlin’s
elite) and playing increasingly significant role
on the market. They try to dictate their rules to
private corporations, domestic as well as foreign
(operating on the Russian territory). The most
illustrative example is Gazprom’s behaviour –
the gas concern uses its control over Russian gas
pipelines network as well as its close relations
with the Kremlin to participate in the other com-
panies’ investments. This way Gazprom has in
fact forced the TNK-BP concern to grant the gas
monopoly the right to participate in the Kovykta
deposit. Recently, Gazprom has been negotiating
with Royal Dutch/Shell about participation in
their Sakhalin-2 project30.
One of the state property development meth-
ods is the overtaking of private property by the
President’s team. The most illustrative example
of such policy is the so-called “Yukos case”, initi-
ated in July 2003. The authorities have accused
Yukos of illegal reduction of their taxes31, multi-
plied tax claims and arrested a great deal of the
concern’s assets. In fact, the aim of the ‘Yukos
case’ is to overtake this concern by the compa-
nies loyal to the Kremlin (probably the state oil
or gas corporations). The “overtaking” initiative
is ascribed to Vladimir Putin’s close associates de-
riving from the security services (the deputy head
of the Presidential Administration Igor Sechin,
among other politicians), who have far-reaching
political influence, but practically no financial
base at their disposal32.
The authorities actions, taken after the so-called
“bank crisis” in summer 2004, may also be seen
as aiming at overtaking private property in the
banking sector. As a result of the “bank crisis” 
a number of Russian banks have gone bankrupt.
Most of them have collapsed because they had
not fulfilled the market standards set up by the
government. However, it seems that this bank-
ruptcy wave (partially initiated by the authori-
ties33) was used by the state Vneshtorgbank to
take over “for a song” the Guta Bank, controlled
by the Moscow mayor Yuri Luzhkov and possess-
ing large industrial assets. Another object of the
state structures interest was allegedly Alfa Bank,
the largest private bank belonging to the oligar-
chic Alfa Group Empire. The bank succeeded to
survive only thanks to an immense financial sup-
port of the Alfa Group34. However, in general the
“bank crisis” has weakened the clients’ trust to-
wards private banks (many have transferred their
deposits to state banks). This has in turn lead to
strengthening of the state banking system.
The state’s attempts at reaching for private pro-
perty, especially the “Yukos case”, have created 
a number of negative consequences in politics
and economy. First and foremost, they have lead
to the investment climate decline. The “Yukos ca-
se” has also played a significant role in submit-
ting the Russian business circles to the Kremlin.
The authorities have thereby demonstrated that
they can use their control over the Tax Office and
the prosecution authorities for fighting political
adversaries and obtaining economic benefits.
5. Increasing control over 
the private business
The process of the state property development
by the Kremlin goes along with advancing pro-
cess of strengthening the control over the pri-
vate business. One can notice a growing govern-
ment’s role in the sphere of the raw material sec-
tor regulations (e.g. in licence issuing), gradual
elimination of tax allowances and gaps from the
tax legislation (among them the so-called tax pa-
radises35) and different financial schemes (among
other things, the tolling scheme36) which had
allowed the businessmen to reduce the taxation
substantially. These actions also testify to the de-
crease of the big business’ lobbying potential.
This potential has been reduced in the parliament
as well as in the Enterprise Council (a governmen-
tal structure), which has changed from a lobbyist
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body into a channel transmitting the Kremlin’s
demands to the business circles37. Together with
the business’ weakening position in the dialogue
with the authorities, one can observe the increase
of the state’s claims towards the private busi-
ness. The claims consist of, on one hand, the de-
mand that business should fully fulfil their tax
obligations, and on the other – of the Kremlin’s
appeals for businessmen to take on a “social res-
ponsibility” and participate in financing numer-
ous social obligations of the state38.
The Kremlin’s domination over Russian business
is complemented by its growing control over fo-
reign investments. A signal of that are the Pre-
sident Putin’s personal encounters with major
foreign investors who are entering the Russian
market (e.g. meeting with the representatives of
Conoco Philips, who has acquired shares in the
oil concern Lukoil). One more thing is imposing
on foreign investors the Kremlin’s rules of oper-
ation on the Russian market (like in the afore-
mentioned case of Gazprom forcing foreign in-
vestors to include it into their projects).
6. The isolationism ideology as the
instrument of gaining social support
For the last few months, the Russian media have
demonstrated an intensification of the Kremlin’s
propaganda, addressed to the society through the
loyal media. The aim of the authorities’ propa-
gandist activity is to justify the strengthening
of the President’s powers and to create strong
social support for such initiatives.
Since the beginning of Putin’s rule, one may ob-
serve the process of making security issues a cen-
tral point of the state ideology and using it to
consolidate the society. Recently, the key aspect
of the “security ideology” has become the terro-
rism phenomenon. Also, the authorities are try-
ing to create an image of Russia as a country be-
sieged by the hostile outside world (especially the
West), and undermined from within by a demo-
cratic “fifth column”39. According to the authori-
ties, the remedy for outer and inner threats is the
unification of forces in the battle against terro-
rism. In practice, this means a strengthening of
the President’s powers at the cost of other cen-
tres of public life, as well as an intensification of
xenophobia (especially towards the Caucasus
people) and distrust towards all forms of dissi-
dence and dissent. Moreover, the Kremlin is trying
to reach the society with the help of the Russian
Orthodox Church. President Putin has appealed
to Orthodox hierarchs for “active participation in
fighting terrorism by boosting society’s morale”.
The Kremlin’s “social strategy” also includes gra-
dual liquidation of the “information dissidence”,
i.e. liquidation of independent political program-
mes on TV and replacing serious debates in the
media with apolitical entertainment.
In many cases the Kremlin propaganda produces
adequate results. For some time now, a growing
susceptibility to isolationism slogans can be ob-
served in the Russian society. In particular, the
Russians’ unfriendliness towards the West (espe-
cially the United States) is growing40. Although 
a large part of the society is critical about the
efficiency of the Kremlin’s battle with terrorism,
still they prefer safety to democratic values and
rights. Moreover, they are ready to give up some
of these rights for the sake of successful battle
with terrorism – 60 per cent of the surveyed are
ready to give up their freedom of movement
around the country and abroad; 59 per cent of the
respondents agree that the organisations and
media, which question the President’s anti-ter-
rorist policy, should be liquidated41.
Still, the efficiency of the Kremlin’s propaganda
is not undisputable. The Russian society often
seems baffled and torn between their fears for
safety (skilfully aroused by the pro-Kremlin me-
dia) on one hand, and their disapproval of the
President’s attempts to strengthen his powers,
on the other. As the surveys show, the majority
of the Russian society sees no connection be-
tween the President’s recent initiatives (e.g. the
nomination of the governors by the Kremlin)
and ensuring of the country’s safety. 60 per cent
of the surveyed does not support these initia-
tives and is in favour of keeping the general elec-
tions of the governors. The respondents also
demonstrate considerable criticism in their evalu-
ation of the authorities’ actions, like in case of
the anti-terrorist action in Beslan or, generally,
the Kremlin’s policy in the security sphere.
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7. Growing influence of the security
service representatives
Since the very beginning of Vladimir Putin’s rule,
we have witnessed a visible expansion in the
appointment of security service representatives
(the so-called “chekists”), as well as their increas-
ing influence on politics, the economy and social
issues42. This tendency has been maintained since
Putin’s re-election. At the moment, the “chekists”
have influence not only on state government
issues, but also have increasing access to finan-
cial resources. The security sector’s growing in-
fluence on the state propaganda can also be ob-
served.
The strengthening of the economic position of
the “chekist” representatives consists of a few fac-
tors. At the present stage of Putin’s rule, a wider
process can be noted of appointing Putin’s close
colleagues from the security services to key
posts in state-controlled companies. These com-
panies often have strategic importance for the
state’s economic security and have multi-million
resources at their disposal. The expansion in the
appointment of security service representatives
is linked with the process of strengthening the
state companies on the market (especially in the
raw material sector)43.
The “chekists” presence in the state companies
can be observed first of all in the raw material
sector as well as in the financial and communi-
cation spheres. One of the most influential “che-
kists”, the deputy head of the Presidential Admi-
nistration Igor Sechin has been appointed the
supervisory board chairman in the state concern
Rosneft (at the moment Rosneft is being merged
with Gazprom into a big corporation dealing with
gas and oil). Earlier, the “chekists” had secured 
a strong position in Gazprom – the concern is
headed by Alexey Miller, Putin’s acquaintance
from Petersburg. Miller is often suspected of being
affiliated with the security services, as are many
Gazprom’s senior managers and directors. An-
other prominent “chekist” Yuri Zaostrovtsev, for-
mer deputy director of the Federal Security Ser-
vice, is now a vice-President of a weighty state
Vneshekonombank. Victor Ivanov, an influential
“chekist” from the Presidential Administration
has been appointed a member of the supervisory
board of the air-potentate Aeroflot. Earlier, Vla-
dimir Yakunin and Georgy Kornilov, former secu-
rity service associates, had been appointed vice-
-Presidents of the Russian Railways company, con-
trolling the railway.
Also the famous “Yukos case” seems to be an ele-
ment of the “chekist” strategy of strengthening
their financial position at the expense of private
business. Thus, a prospering company, indepen-
dent from the Kremlin, has been pushed towards
bankruptcy and will probably be taken over by
structures affiliated with the Kremlin (most likely
it will be a state company controlled by the “che-
kists”). The authorship of the “Yukos case” is often
ascribed to the prominent Presidential Admini-
stration politicians, Igor Sechin and Victor Iva-
nov, the so-called “hawks” of the Administration.
The “chekists” growing influence on the sphere
of ideology is reflected by increasingly wide-rang-
ing and radical “ideological projects” carried out
by the authorities – i.e. the “mobilisation scena-
rio”. It consists of creating isolationist moods in
the society, propagating the so-called “counter-
-espionage” thinking (intensified vigilance, dis-
trust towards strangers, denunciation) and cre-
ating an image of external and internal enemies,
who want to disintegrate and destroy Russia44. All
this goes along with the progressing authorita-
rianism in the domestic policy of Russia.
Since the beginning of Vladimir Putin’s rule (2000)
the position of the whole repression apparatus
of the Russian state has been visibly growing.
First of all, the importance of the state security
and justice organs in solving of key political and
economic problems has visibly increased. Second-
ly, many organs in the security services sector
have been reintegrated and strengthened (the Fe-
deral Border Service has been incorporated into
the Federal Security Service, and the Federal
Agency for Government Communications and In-
formation (FAPSI) – into the Federal Protective
Service [FSO]). Moreover, their competences in
the sphere of security (but also control over eco-
nomy, and finance flows among private compa-
nies in particular) have been enlarged. Thirdly,
the budget expenditure on security and defence
keeps growing every year45. According to the
budget project for 2005, next year the expendi-
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ture is to grow by 27 per cent and amount to
927.5 bln roubles.
8. The Kremlin’s policy 
towards the North Caucasus
The authorities’ actions towards Chechnya and
the whole North Caucasus, carried out after
Putin’s re-election, are the continuation of the
Kremlins “policy of force” initiated back in 1999,
before Putin was elected for President. More-
over, at the moment the appeal for fighting the
“Chechen terrorism” is being used by the autho-
rities for justification of a strengthening of the
President’s powers.
After five years of the military operation, Che-
chnya still is in the state of war. The tension in
other North Caucasus republics as well as the
threat of terrorist attacks all over Russia are grow-
ing46. The fiasco of the Kremlin’s policy of force
has not, however, pushed the authorities to revi-
se their hitherto strategy. On the contrary, every
successive attack was becoming a pretext for affir-
mation of the war scenario or even for harden-
ing the military actions and intensifying the anti-
caucasus rhetoric.
The war in the Caucasus is an important instru-
ment of the Russian domestic policy. In some situ-
ations the unstable situation in the North Cau-
casus and the terrorism threat became a pretext
for strengthening of the President’s powers
and the competencies of the security services
(which happened after the Dubrovka and Beslan
attacks). The “Caucasus threat” is also used by the
Kremlin propaganda for consolidating the society
around the President as the only guarantor of sa-
fety. The Chechen conflict has also been used for
satisfying the Russian army’s ambitions and im-
proving their financial status.
Although President Putin tries to play up the “Cau-
casus threat”, the Chechen issue is becoming an
increasingly serious problem for him. Instabi-
lity in the republic is spreading all over the re-
gion. Also, the “Chechen issue” often demonstra-
tes how helpless Russian military or the security
services are in a situation of a crisis. Another
problematic question for the Kremlin is the fact
that the social support for the “military scenario”
in Chechnya systematically decreases47 and a great
deal of the respondents in the surveys recognise
the war in the Caucasus as the main source of
the terrorist attacks in Russia48.
III. The prospects for Russia’s
further development
The actions the Kremlin has undertaken since
President Putin’s re-election have lead to a rein-
forcement of the following tendencies in the
Russian political system:
– a reduction in political and informational plu-
ralism,
– violation of the autonomy of the legislative
and judicial branches of government,
– the “privatisation” of the state by the President
and his inner circle,
– the progressive decline of public politics (in-
creasing unpredictability and lack of transparency
of decisions and political processes),
– a minimisation of social control of the authori-
ties’ policies.
All this brings the Russian political system in-
creasingly close to the authoritarian model, with
clear domination by the President and his circle,
who direct and control all major processes in
Russia.
The ruling team’s priority task during Putin’s
second term of office is a favourable resolution
of the succession question (in 2008 Putin’s se-
cond and last term of office will come to an end).
As part of this task, we may also expect the ex-
tension of the current President’s rule. In the next
few years, this priority will determine the Krem-
lin’s policy to a great extent. We can expect the
consolidation of the political influence that the
President has already established, as well as a main-
tenance of the control Putin’s team has over fi-
nancial resources. This will consolidate the mono-
centric and authoritarian political system, and
will also strengthen the Kremlin’s position as the
only decision-making body, using the policy of
“manual steering” in many crucial domains. This
kind of political system may freeze the grass-
roots activity of the whole administrative appa-
ratus as well as regional and local authorities. It
may therefore lead to ineffectiveness and ineffi-
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ciency of processes such as the government of
the country and the solution of current problems.
The logic of the “succession scenario” causes the
so-called modernisation project (wide-scale eco-
nomic reforms aimed at reducing the state’s role
in the economy and changing the economy’s
structure) to lose its priority position. Focused
on concentrating power in its own hands, the
Kremlin has not returned to economic reforms
and has not supervised the efficient implemen-
tation of the reformist laws already passed. In-
stead, we can expect the continuation of the cur-
rent economic policy: consumption based on the
highly favourable situation on the oil markets
without undertaking unpopular or expensive
attempts at modernisation. Thus, Russia’s fun-
damental economic problems – including the
archaic model of the economy, the unfavourable
investment climate, the progressive degradation
of the infrastructure and corruption – will in all
probability remain unsolved. Such neglect of these
necessary reforms, together with the assump-
tion of state control over both the Russian econ-
omy and private property greatly reduce the ef-
fects of the liberal economic initiatives of Vla-
dimir Putin’s first term of office. All this also con-
tributes to the worsening of Russia’s internatio-
nal image as a credible, law-obedient and predict-
able partner.
The most probable scenario for Russia for the
next few years is that existing trends will conti-
nue. If high world oil prices are maintained (which
will make Russia’s financial situation stable), we
can expect the continuation of tendencies like the
progressive move to authoritarianism in the Rus-
sian political system and the lack of deep econo-
mic reforms. This will doom Russia to years of sta-
gnation, keeping it politically, economically and
technologically obsolete. On the other hand, if
world oil prices collapse (which is not very like-
ly in the near future), or if the oil and gas extrac-
tion level goes down (which cannot be ruled out
in a mid-term perspective), we could face a seri-
ous economic crisis in Russia. This in turn would
inevitably lead to a political crisis, whose course
and results are as yet hard to predict.
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